This research note presents a dataset on the speed of tariff liberalization in 61 preferential trade agreements (PTAs) signed by 50 states and regional economic organizations over the period 1995 to 2013. We use this dataset to test prominent arguments concerning the impact of market structures on the political economy of trade. For one, intra-industry trade can facilitate trade liberalization by reducing the distributional effects of trade. However, it can also hinder liberalization by concentrating losses on a small number of firms. The rise in global value chains (GVCs) is another type of market structure that affects the political economy of trade by fostering trade in intermediate goods.
Introduction
With the multilateral trade negotiations at the World Trade Organization (WTO) stalled for many years, preferential trade agreements (PTAs) have become the main means to reduce tariffs and liberalize trade. Many contemporary PTAs deal with a large number of non-tariff barriers and trade-related sectors, such as investments, intellectual property rights, procurement policy and competition policy. Nevertheless, the liberalization of trade in goods through tariff elimination remains a core objective of all PTAs. Tariff liberalization, however, does not occur equally for all goods. While some tariffs are eliminated immediately upon entry into force of a PTA, for others the cuts occur over time according to different time schedules. Similarly, while some tariffs are fully eliminated, others are reduced only partially or are even fully exempt from tariff liberalization.
This variation provides fertile ground for testing arguments about how market structures affect the political economy of trade. Two strands of research stand out. The first investigates the consequences of intra-industry trade (IIT) for the political economy of trade. One group of scholars shows that more IIT is associated with greater net support for trade liberalization (Lipson 1982; Milner 1997 Milner , 1999 Manger 2012 Manger , 2015 . IIT may reduce direct competition between products, hence lowering the number of domestic companies that perceive foreign imports as a threat.
Another group of scholars suggests that IIT may empower narrow protectionist groups (Gilligan 1997; Kono 2009; Osgood 2016) . This effect can be expected if IIT makes lobbying for protection a private good, and thus facilitates the political mobilization of protectionist interests.
The second strand of research analyzes the consequences of the globalization of production in the form of global value chains (GVCs) for trade politics. GVCs make companies increasingly reliant on imports of intermediate goods, that is, goods that are sourced for the purpose of serving as inputs for the production of other goods. Via this mechanism, GVCs have been depicted as facilitating trade liberalization (Chase 2005; Manger 2009; Blanchard and Matschke 2014; Gawande et al. 2015; Baccini et al. 2016) , reducing industries' demand for the use of trade remedies (Jensen et al. 2015) , and helping countries to achieve deep economic integration (Antràs and Staiger 2012; Chase 2005; Manger 2009; Johns and Wellhausen 2015; Kim 2015 ).
An original dataset on the speed and extent of tariff liberalization commitments at a highly disaggregated level of 50 states and regional economic organizations in a total of 61 PTAs allows us to test these arguments. The PTAs that we analyze are those signed by the seven largest trading entities between 1995 and 2013. The partner countries of the seven major trading entities include both developed and developing economies, meaning that the dataset exhibits substantial variation in terms of country and market characteristics. The resulting dataset goes far beyond the datasets on tariffs and tariff concessions that earlier research has relied upon. Previous studies focused on the WTO (Pelc 2011) or a single trade agreement (Chase 2003) or a small set of trade agreements (Manger 2012 (Manger , 2015 . The only study so far that relies on tariff data for a large number of countries to assess the political economy of trade aggregates tariffs at the industry level (Gawande et al. 2012 ). Our use of highly disaggregated data from a wide range of countries thus allows for a more comprehensive and robust assessment of the impact of IIT and GVCs on (preferential) trade liberalization than existing research.
Based on this unique dataset, we find limited or no evidence that IIT facilitates preferential liberalization. If anything, in the presence of IIT tariffs tend to go to zero more slowly than in the absence of IIT. This finding is consistent with previous studies highlighting that product differentiation facilitates protectionist groups (Gilligan 1997; Kono 2009 ) or, at the very least, generates conflicting preferences over preferential liberalization among firms operating in the same industries (Osgood 2016) . At the same time, we find that the speed of preferential trade liberalization in intermediate goods is significantly and substantively faster than the speed of preferential trade liberalization in finished goods. This finding suggests that GVCs are a key driver of the proliferation of trade agreements, a result in line with Chase (2005) and Manger (2009) .
Finally, our findings point out a great deal of heterogeneity across countries when it comes to preferential trade liberalization. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to document this variation, since the previous literature has mostly focused on the United States in explaining tariff reduction. Future studies should account for this heterogeneity in both theoretical and empirical models aiming to explain trade policy in the current era of globalization.
Tariff Liberalization in PTAs
We put together an original dataset containing the tariff concessions made by 50 trading entities in 61 PTAs. Table A1 in the appendix lists these PTAs. The 61 PTAs are the subset of agreements concluded by Australia, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea and the US between 1995 and 2013 for which we could extract tariff commitments. We selected these seven trading entities because they are the most important trading powers, are located in different regions of the world, and have signed PTAs with many countries at different levels of development. In several respects, the resulting sample of PTAs is similar to the population of PTAs that were signed in the past 20 years (for a discussion of the population of agreements, see Dür et al. 2014) . For example, 65 percent of the 353 PTAs signed in the period covered here are bilateral agreements; and 67 percent of the PTAs in our sample are bilateral. 1 1 Nevertheless, we cover a disproportionately large number of North-South agreements and a disproportionately small For the 61 PTAs, we extracted 156 tariff schedules, each containing around 5,000 tariff lines at a highly disaggregated level. All PTAs contain at least two tariff schedules, one for country A vis-à-vis country B, and one for country B vis-à-vis country A. Plurilateral agreements, such as the Dominican Republic-Central America Free Trade Agreement, can contain several tariff schedules (in this case, we have seven different tariff schedules). Importantly, therefore, even though we focus on the agreements signed by seven large trading entities, we have extensive variation in terms of number of PTA members and level of development of trade partners in our dataset.
Our data are highly disaggregated, namely at the Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) 6-digit level. At this level, we find tariffs for specific goods, such as "electricity meters" or "molds for glass". The 6-digit level still aggregates tariff rates from a lower level of aggregation (the HS classification allows up to 10 digits). On average, for our dataset, the data at the 6-digit level comprise data for 1.76 lower level tariff lines. In addition to the average tariff existing before entry into force of the agreement, for each year starting with the entry into force of a PTA to the end of the implementation period we collected data on the number of lower than 6-digit tariff lines that are of a preferential type; the average tariff level that applies to the partner countries at the 6-digit level; and the maximum tariff level that applies to the partner countries at this level. The data were compiled from two sources. First, we took tariff data for the year prior to entry into force of the PTA from the World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) dataset, which relies on data reported by customs administrations. Second, we added information on tariff concessions from the officially negotiated tariff schedules listed in the appendices of the PTAs.
number of South-South agreements.
Extracting tariff concessions directly from the tariff schedules, rather than just relying on WITS, has several advantages. First, WITS contains applied tariff rates, rather than the concessions exchanged, which is what we are interested in. Most often, the two will coincide, but in some cases countries may not keep their promises. Second, WITS data are only available for the past, whereas we are also interested in knowing the speed and extent of tariff liberalization in the future in cases in which the implementation has not yet been concluded. Finally, and most importantly, WITS misses data for many preferential tariff lines. For example, for US tariffs on goods from Peru in 2006 (the year the Peru-US free trade agreement was signed) WITS contains data for 2,668 tariff lines. By contrast, our dataset contains tariff rates for 5,250 tariff lines at the same level of disaggregation. Tariff lines are not randomly missing in WITS: in this case, for example, WITS misses all tariff lines for paper products and art objects, and a large majority of tariff lines for textiles. More seriously, for some agreements, average first-year tariff cuts are considerably lower or higher for tariff lines that are in WITS than for the full set of tariff lines. In Figure A1 in the appendix, we show this systematically for 11 US trade agreements.
For PTAs signed by members of the WTO, the WTO stipulates that tariffs on substantially all the trade between the PTA partners have to be eliminated within a reasonable period. WTO rules further specify that a "reasonable length of time" should mean that the time taken to make tariff cuts "should exceed 10 years only in exceptional cases" (World Trade Organization 1994).
Notwithstanding these WTO principles, states have considerable leeway in designing tariff schedules. First, most countries do not bring all their tariffs to zero (see Figure 1 ).
In the year before implementation starts, 37 percent of goods are already duty free. 2 In the year 2 This value slightly overestimates the extent of free trade as, in line with WITS, our dataset lists specific tariffs and tariff rate quotas as zero duties. Second, the transition periods during which tariff cuts are achieved vary across countries (see Figure 2 ). 3 Some countries insist on very long transition phases, which provide domestic producers with some breathing space and a transitory type of flexibility (Baccini et al. 2015) . In fact, in our dataset the majority of PTA tariff schedules foresee tariff elimination over a period longer than the 10-year limit suggested by the WTO. Colombia's tariffs vis-à-vis Canada, for example, are liberalized over a 21-year period. Some PTAs, however, foresee little or no transition phase. Iceland, Norway, Singapore and Switzerland achieve all their tariff cuts immediately upon entry into force of their agreements.
Third, governments can determine whether they want to liberalize tariffs early (frontloading); at a steady pace over time; or late in the transition phase (back-loading). In our dataset, most liberalization takes place immediately when the agreement enters into force, and only a few tariffs are singled out for cuts at a late stage. In the US-Australia trade agreement, for example, the US only left a few tariff cuts to the end, among them the tariff for Australian beef. Of course, since tariff schedules are very detailed, tariff levels can be determined at a highly disaggregated level. Any averages thus hide much variation across tariff lines within specific agreements.
Below, we use the number of years that it takes for a tariff rate to go to zero to measure the ambitiousness of tariff liberalization. We label this variable Time to Zero. Because most tariffs are eventually reduced to zero, taking the overall tariff cut from the year before an agreement enters Years until zero into force to the end of the transition phase would yield little variation across goods. How long it takes for a tariff to be eliminated, in contrast, is an important indicator of the ambition of trade liberalization for that good (Chase 2003) . Any delays give import-competing companies breathing space, while harming exporters. For products that have pre-PTA tariffs equal to zero, calculating
Time to Zero does not make sense. Dropping these observations introduces selection bias since zero-duty products are not a random subsample of the tariff population. To correct this bias, we rely on a Heckman selection model, the details of which are provided below. For robustness checks we also calculate the percentage change between the pre-PTA tariffs and preferential tariffs in the year in which a PTA enters into force, which presents an alternative way of measuring the ambitiousness of tariff liberalization. We label this variable Tariff cut.
Intra-Industry Trade and Global Value Chains
We use our dataset to test key arguments derived from two strands of research on the political economy of trade. These focus on the role of intra-industry trade and global value chains, respectively. In line with the literature that developed these arguments, we build on the assumption that governments implement trade policies with the aim of maximizing support and minimizing opposition from economic actors. They do so either because they anticipate lobbying or are responding to lobbying (Chase 2005; Dür 2010; Manger 2015) , or because they expect that hurting economic actors will reduce electoral support (for example, via increased unemployment). They have ample information about the trade policy preferences of economic actors, either because of their experience with previously implemented trade policies or because such information is made available by economic actors themselves.
Intra-industry trade
IIT measures the extent to which country A exports and imports the same goods and services to and from country B. These goods and services can either be vertically differentiated (they differ in their quality and price, such as a Fiat and a Porsche) or horizontally differentiated (they cater to different consumer preferences, such as high-end Samsung or Apple smart phones). Whereas interindustry trade, which used to be the dominant pattern of market structure, is based on comparative advantage, intra-industry trade results from different tastes and economies of scale.
The consequences of IIT for the political economy of trade are contested (Krugman 1981; Lipson 1982; Gilligan 1997; Milner 1997; Kono 2009; Manger 2012 Manger , 2015 . Most studies find that IIT facilitates trade liberalization by reducing adjustment costs. Inter-industry trade, which is based on comparative advantage, reduces domestic price levels and drives less competitive domestic producers out of business. As a result, domestic producers oppose trade liberalization.
Their lobbying may be counteracted by interests that benefit from cheap imports, such as consumers, wholesalers, and retailers (Destler and Odell 1987) . In most cases, however, the pressure from import-competing producers outweighs the pressure from these free trade interests.
Consumers often fail to organize because of collective action problems. Wholesalers and retailers, moreover, likely face greater uncertainty about the consequences of trade liberalization than domestic producers that face import competition. 4 The situation is different when trade is of an intra-industry type (Krugman 1981; Lipson 1982; Milner 1997; Manger 2012 Manger , 2015 
Global value chains
An alternative strand of research focuses on the role of global value chains for the political economy of trade. Over the past few decades, production has gone global. Because of declining costs of transport and the liberalization of trade and foreign investment, companies have started to source more inputs from countries that have locational advantages, such as a more cost-effective workforce. Trade in intermediate goods now accounts for two-thirds of total imports for the majority of Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) countries (Johnson and Noguera 2012) . Much of this production sharing still takes place within regions such as Europe, North America and Asia (Baldwin and Lopez-Gonzalez 2014) , but currently we are seeing a trend towards genuine global production networks (Los et al. 2015) .
A key consequence of this globalization of production is to make a number of companies In the discussion above, we assume that tariff cuts in PTAs are decided unilaterally. PTAs, however, are the result of negotiations among their future members. The negotiated nature of PTAs should matter most for issues where participating countries need to agree on a single outcome. For example, the provisions on competition policy contained in PTAs tend to apply to all member countries equally. This is not the case for the trade policy outcomes, namely tariff cuts, which we look at in this paper. Country A can cut its tariff for a good while country B keeps its tariff for that same good. The bargaining power of country B could still explain this outcome. In our analysis, however, all member countries of a PTA appear in the dataset both as country A (when explaining their tariff cuts) and as country B (when explaining the tariff cuts they receive in the other member countries). The role of bargaining power, therefore, should cancel itself out.
Empirical Analysis

Explanatory variables
In terms of explanatory variables, to test H1a and H1b we need to operationalize IIT. To do so, we rely on trade data from the BACI database that is disaggregated at the 6-digit level of the HS. 6 We use average trade data over a four-year period, as trade flows can undergo considerable fluctuations. 7 For each tariff line, we calculated the Grubel Lloyd index of IIT (1 − | | ), as is standard in the empirical trade literature (Grubel and Lloyd 1971) . The
Grubel Lloyd index scores between 0 (when countries only import from or only export to the other country) and 1 (when the two countries simultaneously import and export the same amount of a good). 8 Figure A2 in the appendix show the mean of IIT by HS section.
The Grubel Lloyd index is not defined when there is no trade between two countries, since the denominator would be zero. For these observations, and when trade data are completely missing, we set IIT to zero. Since trade data are unlikely to be missing "at random", it is important 6 BACI 2014. We provide more information on this dataset in the appendix.
7 Our results do not change if we use 2-year or 6-year windows. Since BACI data are only available as of 1995, the full 4-year window is not present for the first four years of our time span. The year fixed effects included in our models control for this.
not to lose these observations. To control for them, we include a dummy variable (IIT Missing), which is assigned a score of one in the case of zero trade. Concretely, this implies conditioning the effect of IIT on countries exchanging goods within the given 6-digit HS industry.
In robustness checks, we use Rauch's (1999) classification of goods to distinguish between differentiated and homogeneous goods. This measure is based on the idea that homogeneous goods are sold on organized markets, whereas products with some substitutability have reference prices.
Differentiated is coded 1 for goods that Rauch classified as differentiated and 0 for all others, i.e. For instance, inulin, which is a dietary fiber used in processed food, is coded as a mixed use good, since it is also used both as an input for other products and as final good by consumers. In comparison, malt is coded as a good used solely in intermediary consumption. In the online appendix (section A1), we describe the distinction in greater detail. In the models below, we include a dummy that is coded 1 for intermediate and mixed use goods (labeled Intermediate).
Intermediate and mixed use goods account for 77 percent of the products in our dataset. Tariffs prior to entry into force of a PTA are considerably lower for intermediates than for finished goods (means of 5.6 and 11.7, respectively). 10 This simple fact testifies to the importance of GVCs in the international trading system and suggests that countries' tariff lines had already been shaped in line with the interests of industries relying on imports prior to the date when our analysis begins.
Moreover, Figure A4 in the online appendix shows the proportion of intermediates by HS section.
In some sections, intermediates account for a very large proportion of the products (if not all). The average value of IIT is 0.07 for intermediates and 0.08 for finished goods. The correlation between these two variables is -0.02.
Control Variables
We include several control variables in the models below. First, we control for the level of tariffs before the formation of PTAs (tmin1) to account for the fact that these levels and the speed of tariff liberalization are not independent. Second, we control for exports and imports to avoid confounding the effect on preferential liberalization of IIT and GVCs with the effect on preferential 
Model Specification
Our identification strategy faces several challenges. As already mentioned, 37 percent of the goods in our dataset were duty free in the year prior to implementation of the PTA. To account for the selection effect arising from dropping these duty-free goods, we use a Heckman selection model.
Specifically, we first estimate a probit model that predicts which products have pre-PTA tariffs equal to zero (selection equation). As explanatory variables in the selection equation, we include all our predictors. 12 Moreover, we include a measure of country competitiveness at the 6-digit level as an instrument for the selection equation. The rationale is that tariffs are more likely to be zero in these industries in which countries are competitive. Data on country competitiveness comes 11 For ASEAN, the EU, and CAFTA we take the sum of member countries' GDP and their average value of GDPpc and democracy. For the WTO, we use the minimum value across all member countries, i.e. WTO scores 0 if at least one member country is not a WTO member. 12 We are unable to include country A fixed effects because when doing so we lose almost 50,000 observations due to perfect collinearity. As discussed, IIT and Intermediate are the main explanatory variables. X1 are dyadic control variables at the product level, i.e. IIT Missing, tmin1, Exports, and Imports. X2 are control variables at the country A level, whereas X3 are control variables at the country B level. WTO is a dyadic dummy. α0 and α1 are constants. 1, 2, … 7 and β1, β2, …, β7 are the coefficients of the selection equation and outcome equation, respectively. 9 are country A fixed effects to account for cross-country heterogeneity, whereas τt are year fixed effects to account for year-specific shocks. 14 Finally, ε1 and ε2 are the error terms, which we assume are correlated.
Our unit of analysis is country A-country B-product (at the 6-digit HS level). We rely on directed dyadic data, meaning that tariff cuts always refer to country A in our dataset. Our dataset does not include a time dimension because the de jure tariff reductions that we are interested in are agreed at the time at which the PTAs are signed. The tariff cuts envisaged as being made after entry into force of a PTA are directly agreed by countries at the moment of PTA signature.
Moreover, all the other time-varying independent variables take the value of the year prior to the signature of a PTA. The results do not change if we take the value up to three years prior to the signature of a PTA. Our estimates use robust standard errors clustered by products at the 6-digit HS level.
We conclude with a further note on identification. While Intermediate is presumably exogenous to tariffs cuts, a possible criticism of our empirical strategy is that IIT is endogenous to tariff cuts and not vice versa. This problem is common to virtually all empirical studies that explain 14 We are unable to include 2-digit HS fixed effects, since there is no variation between intermediates and finished goods in many industries. In other words, 2-digit HS fixed effects and Intermediate correlate perfectly for many industries. To address this problem, we run multilevel models, which we discuss below. sectors, we re-run our main models using multilevel statistical analysis with random intercepts and random slopes at the 2-digit HS level. By analyzing variation within and across industries we are able to explore industry-varying effects of IIT and Intermediate (Gelman and Hill 2007) .
Empirical Results
We begin by reporting the results of the selection equations (see Table 1 Looking now at the findings for intra-industry trade, we find that results of IIT are conflicting. The sign of IIT is positive and significant in Model 2, which does not include fixed effects. That implies that for goods for which we observe intra-industry trade, tariffs go to zero more slowly than in the absence of intra-industry trade. On the contrary, the sign of IIT is negative in Model 5, which is a multilevel model with HS2-varying random intercepts. That implies intraindustry trade speeds up tariff cuts. In Models 3, 4, and 6 IIT is not significant at the conventional level. All in all, there is no strong evidence that intra-industry trade facilitates or speeds up preferential trade liberalization. The fact that the coefficient of IIT switches sign when including country-fixed effects and varying intercepts and slopes at the industry level suggests that there is large cross-country and cross-industry heterogeneity. We return to this below.
Looking now at the findings for intra-industry trade, we find that results of IIT are conflicting. The sign of IIT is positive and significant in Model 2, which does not include fixed effects. That implies that for goods for which we observe intra-industry trade, tariffs go to zero more slowly than in the absence of intra-industry trade. On the contrary, the sign of IIT is negative in Model 5, which is a multilevel model with HS2-varying random intercepts. That implies intraindustry trade speeds up tariff cuts. In Models 3, 4, and 6 IIT is not significant at the conventional level. All in all, there is no strong evidence that intra-industry trade facilitates or speeds up preferential trade liberalization. The fact that the coefficient of IIT switches sign when including country-fixed effects and varying intercepts and slopes at the industry level suggests that there is large cross-country and cross-industry heterogeneity. We return to this below.
Since these findings are at odds with some of the previous literature (Lipson 1982; Milner 1997 Milner , 1999 Manger 2012 Manger , 2015 , we perform further tests to check their validity. In particular, we re-run our main models including the dummy for differentiated goods from Rauch (1999) , whose measure relies on the existence of a reference price to distinguish between homogenous and differentiated goods. Product differentiation is another proxy of patterns of bi-directional trade.
Results are reported in Table 2 . In all models, the sign of Differentiated is positive and significant, implying that tariffs of differentiated products go to zero more slowly than homogenous goods and referenced priced goods. Importantly, the results of IIT do not change compared to the previous models, which makes sense given the low correlation between IIT and We now move to analyze the results of Intermediate in Table 1 . The take-home message is unequivocal: the speed of preferential tariff cuts in intermediates is significantly and substantively faster than the speed of preferential cuts in finished goods. This is so although we control for the level of tariffs before the formation of PTAs, i.e. for MFN. The magnitude of the effect is striking. In our best estimate the speed of preferential liberalization in intermediates is about 36 percent faster than the speed of preferential liberalization in finished goods. These findings for Intermediate strongly confirm the importance of GVCs in the current wave of preferential liberalization.
Results of Intermediate are confirmed in Table 2 , i.e. the sign of the coefficient remains negative and significant, though its size is generally smaller than in the models without Differentiated. Moreover, the coefficients for the control variables have the expected signs, adding plausibility to our results. We also note that the inverse Mills ratio is statistically significant in every model, indicating that the error terms of the selection and outcome equations are indeed correlated and that selection bias must be taken into account in the outcome equation.
A major strength of our dataset is that it covers the tariff concessions of many countries.
We use this advantage to test to what extent the findings that we reported for intra-industry trade and intermediates are consistent across countries. For this, we run Model 2 separately for each country in our dataset. Figure 3 shows just the coefficients for IIT and Intermediate by country.
The effect of intra-industry trade is very heterogeneous across countries. In some countries, more intra-industry trade is associated with faster trade liberalization; in other countries we find Coefficient just the opposite. Japan is the only major trading power with a negative and significant coefficient for IIT. Interestingly, the coefficient of IIT is positive and statistically significant for the US and EU. This result seems to imply that narrow interests are particularly powerful in the two major powers, leading to slow trade liberalization as intra-industry trade converts lobbying into a private good (Gilligan 1997 On the contrary, the finding that intermediates are cut more quickly than finished goods applies to most of the countries in our dataset. Only in seven out of 47 countries do we find a positive and statistically significant coefficient for Intermediate, among them the US and the EU.
The results for the US and the EU reveal a specific feature of GVCs. In particular, our findings seem to imply that the two major powers export (mostly high-tech) intermediates to be assembled in southern countries and re-import finished goods from these countries. All the other major traders show a negative coefficient for Intermediate, though the coefficient of South Korea is not statistically significant at the 95% level. Importantly, China cuts tariffs on intermediates substantively faster than tariffs on finished goods, confirming it to be a major hub of GVCs.
Robustness Checks: Tariff Cuts
As an alternative outcome variable, we use Tariff Cut, i.e. the percentage change between the pre-PTA tariffs and preferential tariffs in the year when the agreement's implementation starts. This is another proxy for the ambition of tariff liberalization for a product. We run OLS models, though results are virtually the same if we use fractional regressions, which are particularly suitable for outcome variables ranging between zero and one. Results from the main models, which are reported in Table A3 in the appendix, are generally in line with the previous findings. Specifically, there is conflicting evidence that intra-industry trade facilitates trade liberalization. The coefficient of IIT is negative and significant in models A1 and A2, whereas it is positive and significant in models A3 and A4. The coefficient of IIT is not significant in model A5. On the contrary, preferential cuts in intermediates are significantly and substantively larger than preferential cuts in finished goods in all models, confirming that GVCs speed up trade liberalization. This finding is particularly remarkable given that pre-PTA tariffs on intermediates are already lower than pre-PTA tariffs on finished goods.
Conclusion
We have used an original dataset to test arguments about the impact of IIT and GVCs on the political economy of trade. The effect of intra-industry trade is not clear, with some of our results suggesting that it goes hand-in-hand with faster and greater tariff cuts and others suggesting that it goes hand-in-hand with slower and smaller tariff cuts. These conflictive findings, obtained with an analysis of data for a large set of countries, mirror conflictive findings in past research, where some studies found that IIT makes trade liberalization easier (Milner 1997; Manger 2015) , whereas other research came to the opposite conclusion (Gilligan 1997; Kono 2009 ). Indeed, our results unveil that the effect of IIT on tariff reduction is highly heterogeneous across countries, a point to which we will return below. On the contrary, the results offer support for the argument that GVCs, by stimulating more trade in intermediates, facilitate trade liberalization. Offshoring thus has important effects on the balance of trade policy preferences in countries, a result that is in line with several recent studies (Chase 2005; Manger 2009; Blanchard and Matschke 2014; Jensen et al. 2015; Johns and Wellhausen 2015; Kim 2015; Baccini et al 2016) .
A particular feature of this research note is that it has tested these arguments about the impact of IIT and GVCs using the universe of PTAs signed by seven major trading entities:
Australia, Canada, China, the EU, Japan, South Korea and the US. This has allowed us to also look at variation across countries. Whereas the effect of GVCs is relatively stable across countries, the finding of large cross-country variation in the relationship between IIT and tariff liberalization calls for further research. What explains this variation? One possible explanation is that IIT interacts with electoral institutions to determine trade policy outcomes (Kono 2009 ). Alternatively, the effect of IIT may be conditional on the type of goods a country mainly imports, with IIT possibly having different effects for final consumer goods than for intermediate goods. Our dataset will allow for future research on these issues.
In view of the current backlash against globalization, the policy implications of our paper 
